The third round of Turkish-mediated talks between Somalia and Ethiopia is approaching, scheduled for September 17, 2024, in the capital Ankara. These negotiations will unfold against the backdrop of an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape in the Horn of Africa, characterized by the growing presence of various competing regional and international powers. This evolving situation raises questions about the challenges facing Turkish influence in this strategic region, particularly in light of numerous indications of its recent rise.
Turkey's foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa, encompassing Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, has been intricately linked to the geopolitical tensions and divisions experienced by the countries in this region. Moreover, it has been shaped by broader developments across Africa, especially the intensifying competition among international and regional powers to strengthen their presence in the Red Sea amid a range of emerging changes.
In its efforts to bolster influence and position itself as a key player in the Horn of Africa, Turkey has employed various strategies. These include signing defense cooperation agreements, acting as a mediator in regional disputes, and investing in the energy and oil sectors. However, this multifaceted approach raises important questions about the extent and limitations of Turkey's role, the underlying motives driving its engagement, and Ankara's capacity to fulfill these commitments in the face of numerous regional and international challenges.
There are several indicators pointing to the rising Turkish influence in the Horn of Africa in recent times, most notably:
1. Defense cooperation agreement with Somalia:
In February 2024, Turkey and Somalia signed a comprehensive framework agreement for defense and economic cooperation in Ankara. This ten-year agreement, as outlined by Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, aims to build Somalia's naval capabilities, facilitate the exploitation of natural resources in Somali waters, and enhance protection against illegal activities such as piracy, drug and arms smuggling, and terrorism. By the end of this period, Somalia is expected to have developed its own naval forces capable of assuming these responsibilities.
2. Military cooperation with Djibouti:
Concurrent with its engagement in Somalia, Turkey strengthened its ties with Djibouti in February through the signing of three crucial cooperation agreements. These encompass military training cooperation, military financial cooperation, and a protocol for the implementation of financial assistance, further solidifying Turkey's strategic presence in the region.
3. Exporting drones to Somalia and Ethiopia:
Turkey has actively sought to export its advanced weaponry, particularly drones, to Horn of Africa countries. The Turkish company Baykar supplied Somalia with several Bayraktar TB2 drones, significantly enhancing Somalia's offensive capabilities against the al-Shabaab terrorist group. Additionally, international reports have indicated that Ethiopian federal forces employed Turkish drones in the conflict with the Tigray region. This assertion was further substantiated in December 2023 when the head of Baykar was observed presenting Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed with a drone model, alongside a full-scale drone bearing propeller blades matching those of the Akıncı, Turkey's latest unmanned aerial vehicle.
4. Energy investment agreements:
Turkey's influence extends beyond military cooperation into the energy sector. In March 2024, Turkey and Somalia signed a cooperation agreement for oil and gas exploration, assessment, development, and production in both onshore and offshore Somali areas. This was followed by another agreement in July between Ankara and Mogadishu for hydrocarbon exploration and production. As part of this agreement, Turkey plans to deploy its research vessel "Oruç Reis" to conduct seismic studies off the Somali coast. Furthermore, Turkey has announced its intention to send a drilling ship to explore offshore oil blocks belonging to Somalia in September of this year.
5. Mediation between Somalia and Ethiopia:
Turkey has assumed a crucial diplomatic role as mediator between Somalia and Ethiopia, addressing disputes that arose after Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland, granting it access to the Red Sea. Despite the first two rounds of Turkish-mediated talks ending without resolution, Ankara remains optimistic about achieving a breakthrough during the third round of negotiations scheduled to commence in Ankara on September 17 of this year.
Ankara's Motives
The Horn of Africa's strategic significance in international and regional conflicts is amplified by its unique geographical position. Serving as a nexus between Africa, Asia, and Europe, the region boasts extensive maritime access, bordered by the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, its abundance of natural, mineral, and oil resources further enhances its global importance. In this context, Turkey's primary motivations for expanding its influence in the Horn of Africa can be distilled into three key objectives:
1. Enhancing presence in the Red Sea:
The Horn of Africa's strategic value is largely attributed to its countries' proximity to the Red Sea. Recent events, such as the Israeli-Gaza conflict and Houthi attacks, have underscored this importance by directly threatening international shipping in this vital waterway—a crucial route that facilitates 12% of global seaborne trade and approximately 30% of global container traffic.
Turkey's efforts to bolster its presence in Red Sea-facing African nations are designed to strengthen its regional influence. These initiatives build upon previous strategic moves, including the establishment of Turkey's largest overseas military base in Somalia in 2017 and a 2016 agreement with Djibouti to create a five-million-square-meter free economic zone along the Red Sea.
2. Implementing a strategy for military expansion outside Turkey:
Despite the relatively small size of Turkish defense companies compared to major Western and Russian counterparts, Ankara aims to gradually establish itself as a key supplier in the Horn of Africa's arms market. This strategy serves to secure Turkey's interests and enhance its regional influence. The increasing popularity of Turkish drones in African conflicts exemplifies this shift, as evidenced by Turkey's remarkable 27% growth in international defense and aerospace exports in 2023, reaching a record $5.5 billion.
Turkish defense products offer several advantages to African countries. They are known for their cost-effectiveness and technical reliability, attributes that have been proven in conflicts across Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. These products are particularly valuable for nations grappling with insurgencies, poorly-resourced armies, and porous borders, such as Togo, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. Moreover, Turkey provides drones and counter-terrorism expertise without imposing conditions on governance or human rights commitments, making their offerings especially attractive to certain African states.
By increasing arms sales to Africa, Turkey seeks to reposition itself as an influential medium-sized power in a multipolar world. The long-term dependencies created by these sales—including reliance on ammunition, spare parts, and maintenance—provide Turkey with valuable leverage in future negotiations.
3. Diversifying crude oil supplies:
Through its agreements with Somalia, Ankara aims to play a more dominant role in energy extraction—a sector it has long sought to enter to achieve energy independence and diversify its crude oil supplies. This initiative, while not new, aligns with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's 2020 expression of interest in importing oil from Somalia, as part of Turkey's broader strategy to reduce reliance on energy imports from Russia and Iran.
Overall, Ankara emerges as the primary beneficiary of cooperation with Horn of Africa countries, largely due to the myriad challenges these nations face. Widespread ethnic and tribal conflicts, escalating armed confrontations, and persistent border disputes plague the region, significantly impacting the stability of governing political systems. Consequently, the efficacy of agreements and allocation of resources intended for development in Horn of Africa countries is often compromised. In some cases, these resources are even diverted to procure weapons, further fueling conflicts among various factions rather than fostering progress and stability in the region.
Turkey's strategic advantage is further enhanced by its cooperation with this vital region, particularly Somalia and Djibouti, which are strategically located at the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Gulf of Aden. The defense cooperation agreement signed with Somalia in February of the previous year further solidifies Turkey's dominance in the region.
Competition Challenges
The global shift towards a multipolar world, marking the end of the unipolar era, potentially benefits Turkey's presence in Africa. This transition may complicate the European Union's efforts to formulate a coherent African policy and highlights the failure of most U.S. initiatives on the continent. However, Turkey's role in the Horn of Africa faces a significant challenge from major international powers, particularly Russia and China.
These powers view the region as strategically influential and are actively strengthening their presence in Africa, creating a competitive landscape across military, economic, and geopolitical spheres. Furthermore, the rivalry among numerous international and regional powers for influence in Somalia, coupled with the country's security, political, and economic challenges, poses obstacles to Turkey's defense cooperation agreement with Somalia and Ankara's aspirations for a more prominent role in the Horn of Africa.
Recent developments necessitate careful diplomatic maneuvering. For instance, in light of Egypt's recent military movements in Somalia, Ankara must coordinate with Cairo to avoid potential conflicts of interest. This need for coordination comes at a time of significant improvement in Turkish-Egyptian relations, as evidenced by recent high-level diplomatic exchanges.
The progress in bilateral ties culminated in Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's historic visit to Ankara on September 4, 2024—his first since assuming office. This visit reciprocated Turkish President Erdogan's trip to Cairo in February 2024, which marked his first visit in 12 years. During el-Sisi's stay in Ankara, the two leaders co-chaired the inaugural meetings of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, resulting in the signing of several memorandums of understanding across various fields. These developments reflect a mutual desire to strengthen bilateral relations and coordinate on issues of common interest, primarily concerning Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and the conflicts in Gaza and Libya.
In conclusion, despite the challenges facing Turkey's presence in the Horn of Africa, this region is expected to remain a top priority for Turkish foreign policy. This continued focus is driven by increasing cooperation in the security and military sectors, with more African countries turning to Turkish defense equipment and expertise. These agreements are likely to pave the way for Ankara to seek greater influence in other Horn of Africa nations, including Djibouti, through the training and preparation of its forces by the Turkish military.
